In many markets, large and small¯rms coexist. As large¯rms can in principle out-compete small ones, the actual presence of the latter asks for an explanation. In ours, we focus on the dimensionality of markets, which can change as a consequence of product innovations, preference elaboration or institutions. We show that increasing market dimensionality substantially enlarges the market periphery relative to the market center, which creates new potential niches for small¯rms. We thereby provide a parsimonious explanation for small¯rm subsistence.
Introduction
The coexistence of large and small¯rms has captured the attention of social scientists for decades. 1 Large¯rms have more demand, pertaining scale economies, 2 and can outcompete small¯rms when their fundamental niches overlap, a or prevent them from entering the market. 5 Therefore, the entry and enduring presence of small¯rms ask for an explanation. This is not only of scienti¯c interest, but is also important for society, as small¯rms increase product choice, create jobs and account for the bulk of major innovations. 6 a Analogous to the niche concept in biology, 3 a¯rm's fundamental niche is a point set of positions in the n-dimensional attribute space, or market, where it can sustain. A¯rm's realized niche is the point set left for it in the presence of competitors with their fundamental niches intersecting, or overlapping, with the focal¯rm's.
To address this problem, we explore the (potential) socio-economic consequences of changing dimensionality of the markets where organizations reside, or of attribute spaces in general. Dimensionality change modi¯es certain geometric properties of these spaces, in particular their center-periphery structure. We demonstrate how this center-periphery change tilts the balance between large and small¯rms' opportunities in favor of the latter.
Our approach feeds into the research tradition in economics 7 and organization science 8 that considers the demand distribution over a multidimensional space a main explanatory variable. 9 Our model also applies to demand for ideologies, policies 10 and religions, but for simplicity we will only speak about markets with¯rms and their audience, which in turn consists of consumers and other (potential) stakeholders. Demand for organizational o®erings, such as products and services, is distributed over n traits of these o®erings, spanning an n-dimensional attribute space. Each variant of these o®erings and each audience taste is represented by a point in this space, respectively, while the (Euclidean or other) distance between an o®ering point and a taste point measures their degree of mismatch. 11 Increasing market dimensionality means a change in the number of product characteristics that actors consider, re°ecting, for example, an elaboration of consumer tastes.
b Demand distributions often show up a center-periphery structure, where the center contains mainstream preferences and the periphery has lower levels of demand from nonmainstream tastes. Empirically, the following markets have been shown to have a center-periphery structure: newspapers, automobiles, beer, wine, banks, auditing, medical diagnostic equipment and airlines; for a review, see Ref. 8 . Resource partitioning theory explains small¯rm survival in terms of a partitioning of the audience between the center, where large¯rms thrive on mainstream tastes, and the periphery, where small¯rms specialize in scarcer and less contested demand. Eventually, small¯rms have a niche space for themselves without competitive pressure from large¯rms. 8 One way for small organizations to get niche space is when large¯rms, often generalists with a broad niche, move to the center, where most resources and demand are to be found. Those¯rms then lose their appeal to peripheral tastes, for example a newspaper that¯lls its pages with national news that appeals to mainstream tastes, at the expense of regional gossip and news. 13 In general, a constraint from biology applies: the principle of allocation 4 states that there is a trade-o® between niche width and¯tness of an organism, in our case between a¯rm's niche width and its audience appeal. It implies that when a¯rm over-stretches its breadth of consumer taste varieties, it will lose customers. Economists speak about diseconomies of scope.
14 Consequentially, large organizations that move to the center free up peripheral space for small organizations, where specialists with a relatively narrow niche can move in.
b Price also counts, but is not considered as a spatial product dimension because it is not an intrinsic product characteristic. Prices are assigned by the broader market context instead. Moreover, for consumers the ideal price for a product is (normally) zero.
Along with seizing opportunities when generalists move on, specialists can also di®erentiate themselves, by developing a distinguishing product (or producer) identity in opposition to the center players. A case in point is the American beer market, where microbreweries made identity claims in terms of authenticity of traditional small-scale production methods, which appealed to an audience. They could thereby open up and secure niches unaccessible to mass-producing beer manufacturers. 8 Our model abstracts away from speci¯c market strategies. It builds upon the geometry of an earlier model 15 that showed that changing attribute space dimensionality has substantial consequences for the pertaining market structure and the economic agents populating it. That model explains the subsistence of smallniche organizations in crowded markets with reference to results of the spherepacking problem in mathematics. 16 Researchers of this problem look for the densest packing of a given n-dimensional space with nonoverlapping equal-radius hyperspheres. A central¯nding is that the density of the best packing strongly decreases with dimensionality. For example, the known best packing in n ¼ 10 dimensions covers only 10% of the total space. 16 A decrease of packing density indicates an increase of empty space in between the touching spheres, which in turn social scientists used to represent large¯rms' niches. 15 The sphere-packing model applied to markets predicts that increasing dimensionality, in terms of product traits taken into account by the audience, opens up competition-free areas in between incumbent rms' niches, which are potential locations for small market entrants. We improve upon the niche-packing model in three ways. Rather than a homogeneous demand distribution, we assume a center-periphery distinction, in line with the empirical¯ndings listed above. A second di®erence is that small¯rms in our model enter at the market peripheries rather than only in between the large¯rms. Third, we loosen the assumption of spherical nonoverlapping niches, and make no strong assumption about their shapes or overlaps. We do agree with all previous theories, though, that¯rms' crowding in the same niche lowers their survival chances, and that large¯rms have more resources to force small ones out of their niche than the other way around. 17 Consequentially, small¯rms need low-competition areas to survive, which we set out to explain.
An advantage of geometric models, such as ours, is that outcomes are partly explained by properties of the space and therefore require less assumptions about the actors, their strategies and their actions. In our case, we do not need the assumption that large¯rms move to the center, or that small¯rms develop and signal distinguishing identities. Also the actual causes of dimensionality increase, such as elaborating preferences, new institutions or innovations, need not be explicated. Our model is coarse-grained, 18 and it relates the attribute space volume and its dimensionality exactly, without¯ne-grained predictions of¯rms' sizes, strategies or actions. Rather, it tells what overall outcome can be expected when dimensionality increases. While this way of modeling is somewhat o®-mainstream in the social sciences, it is well-known in the natural sciences. Consider, for example, the valuable yet simple insight that increasing background radiation speeds up the process of evolution through increasing the number of mutations. Yet it does not predict which, or how many, species will develop. In our approach, we can predict that the enlarged market periphery facilitates small¯rm presence, but we cannot predict what kind of rms, or how many, will enter. Under some conditions, such as a crisis, the prohibition of certain substances, or an innovation that obliterates previous ones, dimensionality can decrease. In those cases our model can be used in the opposite way, and it then predicts decreasing opportunities for small¯rms. For example when modern processor technology removed weight from the list of ICT characteristics, it caused a shakeout among wellestablished producers of vacuum tubes. Only few vacuum tube producers survived, by specializing in the domains of high-end audio appliances and in military equipment resistant to the electromagnetic pulse of nuclear explosions.
In Sec. 2, we lay out our model and demonstrate that increasing attribute space dimensionality yields more opportunities at the peripheries than at the center, which in turn tend to be crowded already. For small¯rms to bene¯t from this space, two additional conditions have to be ful¯lled, though, treated in Sec. 3. First, at the peripheries of higher-dimensional attribute spaces, demand should cluster in patches, for reasons explained below. We borrow a synchronization model to argue under which circumstances this condition can be ful¯lled. Second, for large¯rms it should not be feasible to compete with small ones at the peripheries. We will elaborate on the principle of allocation to argue when this condition is ful¯lled. In Sec. 4, we discuss our model and suggest possible generalizations.
Model
From a potentially large number of attribute dimensions, only few are important. These salient dimensions can be found by analyzing empirical data, for example obtained by studying consumers on the substitutability, 0 s kj 1, of¯rm k's o®erings by¯rm j's. Alternatively, archival data can be used, e.g. from the Web. Either way, the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest eigenvalues of the substitutability matrix 19 (with cells s kj ) will point out the salient dimensions on which we focus in the remainder. On the o®ering side, salient dimensions are the traits along which¯rms can di®erentiate their o®erings in order for them to decrease competition with other¯rms. On the demand side, salient dimensions are audience traits that matter for people's purchasing or job-taking decisions.
Consider a market space with n salient dimensions. For both metric and nonmetric spaces, the span of the demand distribution along each dimension is¯nite: audience traits such as age and education have lower and upper bounds, and the number of meaningful categories that can be distinguished by humans, e.g. styles of jeans, is limited, even when people learn to make subtle distinctions. We therefore model the attribute space as a¯nite segment of the in¯nite n-space, such that each dimension i, metric or not, has a¯nite diameter or number of categories d i , respectively. This n-space segment of interest is composed of cells, each corresponding to a distinguishable value combination of the n traits that span the space. Consequentially, d has integer values only.
As elaborated above, tastes oftentimes have a center-periphery distribution, such that center tastes are more frequent than peripheral tastes, or some categories more frequent than others. The center-periphery distribution of demand we stylize accordingly into our key assumption: for each dimension i, its¯nite diameter d i can be divided into a center c i > 0 and a periphery p i > 0, so that d i ¼ c i þ p i . In Appendix A, we describe how the center-periphery dichotomy generalizes to quasi-continuous unimodal distributions. For nonmetric spaces, the only partial ordering required is that the categories, or category combinations, that constitute the center are surrounded by some peripheral categories. As we demonstrate below, it is not the number of peripheral cells, but just the existence of them on both sides of the center on each dimension that is needed for our model, such that the number of cells m i on each dimension m i ! 3.
To facilitate the presentation of our argument, we simplify the unimodal distribution by assuming a center to market span ratio c i =d i that is constant along all dimensions. We thus proceed with nonindexed c; p and d values. We demonstrate in Appendix A that this simpli¯cation does not reduce the generality of our result. It is important to emphasize that our conclusion relies only on two scalars without physical dimensions, n and the c=d ratio (cf. Eq. 3); therefore our¯ndings are scale invariant. Since c and d are given model parameters, our results depend upon a single independent variable, dimensionality n. A market can now be modeled as an n-dimensional hypercube with edge d. The hypervolume V ðdÞ n is
For cubic markets, n ¼ 1. Oftentimes, extreme combinations of product or demographic characteristics do not occur empirically, for example product o®erings for highly educated toddlers, given that age and education are salient dimensions. Since the extreme value combinations locate at the edges of the hypercube, an edgetruncated attribute space is better modeled by a hypersphere. As a matter of fact, our representation also applies to cases when the market in question is a hypersphere with radius d, where n depends only on the dimensionality.
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The hypervolume V ðpÞ n of the periphery with width p is
from which it follows that the ratio of the periphery volume to the entire market volume is
If n increases, Eq. (3) converges to 1, hence the bulk of the attribute space volume shifts to the periphery. This volume shift toward the periphery creates room for new c While the hypercube volume (1) is a monotonic increasing function of n, a hypersphere volume may under certain conditions decrease with increasing dimensionality when n is large. 20 We discuss this possibility in Appendix A, and point out that those conditions are unlikely to hold true for actual markets. entrants to proliferate.
d Empirically, this should show up in the size distribution of rms. 21 Consider, for example, a market center encompassing half of the total market diameter, c ¼ 1 2 d and n ¼ 5, which is not an extraordinary high dimensionality. 22 In this example, the periphery contains 97% of the total market volume (Table 1) , but even when substantially enlarging the width of the center to c ¼ 3 4 d, still 76% of the market volume is at the periphery. Moreover, the e®ect shown in Eq. (3) is su±-ciently robust to counterbalance the e®ect of much higher demand density at the center than at the periphery. Assume, for example, a¯ve times denser center demand. Then in our two examples about 20% and 15% of total demand, respectively, would be at the peripheries. Two additional conditions should be met, however, namely that peripheral demand concentrates into patches, and that large¯rm's fundamental niches do not overlap with small¯rms' at the periphery, to be elaborated in the next Section.
Peripheral Patches
Because our focus is on dimensionality change, we do not assume that with changing market dimensionality, the total amount of demand (carrying capacity) changes as well, which then would have an e®ect of its own. Spreading the same amount of demand over more cells, however, implies that demand will spread thinner on average. Volume increase with upward dimensionality change is much larger at the periphery than at the center (Eq. (3)), where demand is denser anyhow and stays relatively dense also at high dimensionality. The density di®erence becomes ever larger with increasing dimensionality, and peripheral demand may spread very thin indeed. Below some density threshold, scarce demand does not support a minimal sustainable level of operations. Empirically, however, we often do see small¯rms at market peripheries, suggesting demand density variations between periphery locations. For small¯rms to subsist in high dimensional peripheries, it is in fact a Table 1 . Periphery-entire-market volume ratio, V ðpÞ n =V ðdÞ n , as a function of dimensionality n, and of the proportion of center-breadth to market span c=d. 23 to do so already exists, and we borrow it gratefully. According to 19th century sociologist Emile Durkheim, societies (where¯rms can°o urish) have a certain level of social cohesion among their inhabitants. 24 With modern network theory in mind, one could say that this cohesion consists in part of social ties that people have with others in that society, and for another part of solidarity that people have with society as a whole. In an appropriate synchronization model, 23 the network and tastes co-evolve, while solidarity (coupling strength) is varied by the researcher. Individuals' tastes form a symmetric unimodal distribution, consistent with our assumption of demand, and the network dynamics is based on the mechanisms of homophily, 25 i.e. a higher chance of tie formation or strengthening between similar people, and homeostasis, i.e. individuals' limited capacity to maintain ties, such that stronger ties with some people imply weaker or no ties with others. People can in°uence each other's tastes through social ties, and are all in°uenced by overall solidarity. By varying solidarity, one can investigate in this model when social network clusters emerge, and to what extent the tastes in those clusters are similar.
In a society with N people, individual i has an intrinsic taste ! that does not change, which in the model is a natural frequency. The individual's actual taste, represented as phase i ðtÞ, changes through weighted ties W ij with other individuals having tastes of their own, and by overall solidarity . The representation of tastes as phase oscillators may seem outlandish, but it turns out to be a useful stepping stone toward nontrivial predictions at the network level. Individual i's actual taste evolves according to
while the weighted ties W ij evolve as a consequence of homophily and homeostasis (not shown here). Following Yoshiki Kuramoto's work from 1970s, 26 synchronization is expressed in terms of a complex order parameter re i ðtÞ , where 0 r 1 measures the similarity, or coherence, of individuals' actual tastes (phases) and ðtÞ is the average taste. In the simplest version of this model, everybody is equally strongly connected to everybody else in a¯xed network. Then, increasing coupling entails a phase transition from asynchronous oscillations toward synchronization, at a critical value c that only depends on the distribution of initial tastes. Likewise in the dynamic network model, when solidarity is beyond the critical threshold, e.g. because of an external threat to society, one big synchronized cluster emerges wherein the majority of people have very similar (though not identical) tastes. For small¯rms this means that there is no room for them to di®erentiate their o®erings from the large¯rms, by which they will be outcompeted. Without solidarity, in contrast, there are no coherent clusters at all, such that there are no peripheral demand-patches for small rms. Still, central tastes occur more frequently than peripheral tastes, such that (some) large¯rms can survive at the market center. For low to intermediate values of solidarity, however, the network evolves into nearly separate clusters that are highly synchronized locally, with relatively low (but oscillating) global synchronization. This implies that for a speci¯c range of solidarity values, neither too low nor too high, there are patches of similar tastes that are markedly di®erent from each other, in which small¯rms can specialize to survive. e However, this result invokes the question why peripheral patches, if they occur, are not occupied by incumbent large¯rms. Yet¯rms cannot span their niches arbitrarily broad: from a certain breadth onward, diseconomies of scope prevail.
14 Firms have to trade-o® niche width for audience appeal, which has been modeled as a constant volume under a¯rm's (unimodal)¯tness curve over trait dimensions.
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Both this¯rm trade-o® and individual's homeostasis of social ties are instances of the principle of allocation. 4 For large¯rms it implies that the larger the periphery, the more di±cult it is for them to appeal to increasingly diverse tastes. Moreover, if dimensionality increases, and demand is distributed over an increasingly larger periphery space, the average distance between demand patches also increases. Consequentially, a large¯rm that increases its niche width will appeal ever less, making it progressively less likely that it can exploit peripheral niches successfully. Meanwhile, the areas sparse in demand in between peripheral patches prevent small rms specialized in certain audience tastes to invade other patches. The increasingly large void or sparse areas that separate patches thus bu®er competition. In this tness landscape we do not need to assume that large¯rms move to the center, because the principle of allocation applied to our model points out that they cannot appeal to peripheral tastes. Exceptions are possible when the market diameter is small and dimensionality is low, for example at the inception of a new market when a new product (brie°y) appeals to everybody.
The issue whether¯rms are independent, outlets of a chain, or under the umbrella of a holding company is largely unimportant for our general result, except that small rms that do get part of their resources from a holding company can have a survival advantage. If they are over-exploited by the holding, in contrast, the opposite outcome is to be expected.
Discussion
The in°ow of many small¯rms in markets dominated by large¯rms was a conundrum for standard economic theories, which presumed that barriers to entry prevent this from happening, or that large¯rms with economies of scale would easily out-compete the small entrants. We have explained the proliferation of small¯rms with increasing dimensionality, without assuming an increasing market span, an increasing carrying capacity, large¯rms moving to the center or small¯rms signaling distinguishing identities. Our explanation is parsimonious and does not require strong assumptions on¯rms' strategies or actions, only the weak assumption that if low-competition areas occur, at least some small¯rms seize their opportunities.
The core of our explanation is the geometric argument that hinges on the assumption of a single-peaked demand distribution. This assumption has substantial empirical support, listed at Sec. 1. We also used stylized facts and general mechanisms found by others, namely the principle of allocation, homophily, social in°uence and social cohesion. The synchronization model that we applied points out when small¯rms are not expected to survive in high dimensional markets, namely in societies with too high solidarity (unless there exist no large¯rms at all).
We mention two aspects for potential model generalization. First, we did not investigate the impact of an increasing or decreasing market span on a given dimension. An example is the substitution of turbojet engines for piston engines on aircraft, which increased the span on the speed dimension of this market 28 without changing its dimensionality. One might incorporate changing spans in our framework by relaxing our assumption on the demand distribution.
A second aspect for future study might be the possibility of peripheral patches to develop into new market centers. Two empirically well-documented examples are known to us. One is the video games industry, 29 that started out decades ago at the periphery of the entertainment industry, and became a major¯eld of itself. Another is the post-communist Bulgarian media industry, wherein the once peripheral anticommunist press developed into a second market center after the decline of the Soviet Union, and where various small¯rms surrounded these two centers. 30 Our geometric model can accommodate such settings if our demand distribution assumption is generalized in the following way. The multiple centers form one super-center that features saddles connecting the local maxima of demand. At the periphery around the super-center, volume increase with increasing dimensionality will enhance small¯rm survival, just like in our model. An additional possibility is that those saddles allow for the occasional presence of small center-players, alongside the large ones.
Appendix A Generalization to quasi-continuous unimodal demand distributions. First, add an intermediate domain (semi-center) to the dichotomic center-periphery distinction. The analogue of Eq. (3) then predicts that for increasing dimensionality, volume proliferation for the semi-center will be larger than for the center, and yet will be larger for the periphery than for the semi-center. Now let us partition the demand distribution into an arbitrary number of slices, such that slice s iþ1 envelops its neighbor s i . Then the analogue of Eq. (3) predicts that volume proliferation with dimension increase will be larger for the outer slice s iþ1 than for s i . Increasing the numbers of slices along all given dimensions of the demand distribution yields the continuous distribution in the limit of i to in¯nity. But since the number of (for the audience) discernible product variations along a given product characteristic is nite, even along continuous product attribute scales (e.g. size, color), the demand distribution can only be quasi-continuous at best.
Generalization to demand distributions where the periphery-to-market volume ratio can di®er along dimensions. We have already demonstrated that the periphery-to-market volume ratio V ðpÞ n =V ðdÞ n , or PMR for short, converges to unity with increasing dimensionality, no matter how broad or narrow the center c i is with respect to the market d i (Eq. (3); Table 1 ). Let us assume that c i =d i is di®erent along di®erent dimensions of a given market 1, while keeping the market span¯xed along all dimensions, so d i ¼ d. Then take the maximum of c i values, maxðc i;1 Þ, in market 1, and consider a market 2 of the same dimensionality and span as market 1, but where market 1's maxðc i;1 Þ value applies uniformly to all dimensions of market 2, c i;2 ¼ maxðc i;1 Þ. Clearly, the center of market 2 is larger than that of market 1, while their total market volumes are equal. Therefore, PMR 2 PMR 1 . Because PMR 2 converges to 1 with increasing dimensionality (3), and cannot exceed 1 by de¯nition, PMR 1 will also converge to 1.
Nonmonotonicity of market volume. For cubic markets that ful¯ll our demand distribution assumption, both center and periphery volumes increase monotonically with n. However, the volume of a hypersphere of a given diameter is nonmonotonic with n, 16 illustrated in Fig. 2 of Ref. 20 . The volume¯rst increases with n, passes a maximum at n Ã ðdÞ, decreases, and eventually converges to zero. This shrinking depends on the diameter, and happens¯rst for the center, which has a smaller diameter than the periphery. But how relevant is it for social science? It all depends on the scale of measurement. In sociological and economic cases, the choice of units of measurement is not arbitrary. In our idealized model, we have a space spun by continuous scales. But all scales that stand for empirical variables must obey a smallest di®erence between values that actors can perceive and¯nd meaningful, for example shoe and cloth sizes, paint colors or the alcohol content of beverages. These cognitively-based perception di®erences provide natural grain sizes for the scales on the dimensions of the attribute space, even when acknowledging possibilities for cultural re¯nement. When d ¼ 2, thus the radius of the hypersphere equals one, the turning point from increasing to decreasing volume is at n Ã ð2Þ ¼ 5. For the sake of demonstration, consider a slight diameter increase, n Ã ð2:4Þ ¼ 10. This is twice as many dimensions as found in an empirical study. 22 But as said, cell counts must have integer values, and if people distinguish at least three di®erent values on each dimension, the number of dimensions at which a market starts to shrink is way beyond the number of salient dimensions.
